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Practical Effects of the Securities Act *
By Ralph T. Crane

In attempting to discuss the practical effects of the securities
act of 1933, one is impressed with the comparatively small number
of such effects for a piece of legislation so vast in its scope, so
far-reaching in its provisions and relating to so essential a branch
of our economic structure. This is not saying that such effects
are not of great importance and import. On the contrary, they
are materially important, but they are not great in number.
The advent of this law was not altogether unexpected. The
possibilities and even the advisability of a law of like purpose had
been discussed by many for a number of years. Various sugges
tions had been made to and by members of congress. Some
suggestions were incorporated in bills introduced in congress.
Investment bankers had made some very specific suggestions for
national legislation, which they then believed and still believe
would have been effective and workable. Although all of these
suggestions were advanced in perfect good faith and with nothing
other than the highest motives back of them, they seemed to fall
on inattentive ears until President Roosevelt, in harmony with
platform pledges, made specific recommendations to congress and
set the drafting machinery in motion.
In the early stages of the presentation of proposals for the law
it became apparent that provisions of the law proposed were being
drafted by persons wholly unfamiliar with the accepted and
practical methods employed in the issuance and distribution of
securities, as well as with the legal aspects of formulating a secur
ity issue, the technique of secondary markets and other important
phases of the business. This, although possibly needlessly,
caused anxiety and suspicion as to ultimate intent, not easily re
moved even though not justified. Corporate officers, financiers,
investment bankers, already preoccupied with very specific in
dividual problems incident to the depression, carried these anx
ieties over to the time of the actual enactment of the law and then
found provided in the law new requirements entailing great and
unusual expenditures, new rules of procedure and, particularly,
* An address before the American Institute of Accountants at Boston, Massachusetts, October
17, 1935.
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new standards of possible or contingent liabilities and new rules
as to allowable defenses. There was then and for a considerable
time thereafter a rather definite and general feeling that the
anxieties of pre-enactment days were well founded.
Corporate officers and corporate management were fearful of
their freedom of action in any financing, new or refunding, in
volving any element of interstate transactions. This, of course,
applied to the great majority of the substantial industries, a
number of which were sorely in need of readjustments which
would normally have been possible under the cheap money
conditions.
Dealers in securities and particularly underwriters were con
fronted with new rules of conduct, new requirements and new
responsibilities not easy of interpretation and, in some instances,
difficult of definite determination.
Accountants found requirements for material changes in some
of the theretofore accepted practices—not necessarily adverse or
unwarranted changes, but changes nevertheless. This required
careful thinking and careful determination of their future course
and procedure. Above all, they were faced with liabilities, con
tingent at least, apparently mandatory, which those of responsi
bility would not assume.
Lawyers, acting on the side of safety for their clients, were slow
in giving opinions as to legal effects of a number of the provisions
of the law and ultimately hesitated to give assured interpretations
as to a number of the phrases and clauses. The best legal minds
cited certain important provisions which they insisted were sus
ceptible of two or more interpretations.
There is no doubt in the minds of men close to the situation
that all these things materially contributed to the very definite
slowing down of overdue readjustments and refinancing at a time
when they should have been accelerated. Since, in the emer
gence from a depression, new financing must necessarily follow
the readjustment period, to the extent readjustments were de
layed new financing was also delayed.
Strange as it may seem, the enactment of the law, by reason of
the publicity of discussions incident to its consideration and
the all-too-frequent assertions about the alleged past misdeeds of
corporation officers, financiers and investment bankers and of
business in general, coupled with the generally known fact that
corporate directors, bankers, dealers and accountants were loath
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to assume the liabilities under the law, weakened rather than
enhanced the public confidence in business and in investments.
The amendments of 1934, plus a somewhat changed official
attitude toward corporate management and investments and,
especially, the high character of the administration of the law
have relegated most of these effects into the temporary class.
Cost is always a major item of business. Likewise it is a
major effect of this law—permanent, so far as we can see. It is
too early to attempt any comparison between cost and benefits,
especially dollar costs and dollar benefits. Neither is it possible
to state the whole item of cost in any concrete form. We do
know, however, that the item of cost is considerable and must be
passed on to some branch of the public. Whether this is in the
form of reduced dividends, increase in production or operating
costs, ultimately to be reflected in sales or service price or by
taxation to cover costs of administration, is immaterial.
Through the registration provisions the law has definitely
placed on file in a public place all the material information, and
more, relating to all new issues not exempt under the law.
The essentials of this information in turn must be incorporated in
the prospectus made available to every investor. No one now
can even allege there is no opportunity for finding out the facts.
There is no longer any cause for complaint at not being able to
judge a given security on the basis of fact according, solely, to
one’s ability to read and understand the facts.
The resultant value of these requirements is not so clear.
Normally one might expect the investing public to be benefited
by the new as against the old method. But, is it? We hope so.
Experienced investors, investors of or with considerable means
received or got all essential facts prior to the new methods.
Other investors with knowledge of their inexperience placed their
dependence in others of known qualifications for guidance.
Others, wholly uninformed and inexperienced and without ability
adequately to inform themselves, then, as now, invested blindly,
under impulse, according to some dream idea or in a spirit of
gamble, catch as catch can.
We must not rest here, however, and say there are no resultant
benefits to investors. It is more by indirection than by direction
that beneficial effects have reached investors. The requirements
of the law as to detailed information, the placing of this informa
tion on public file subject to almost universal, to say nothing of
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official, scrutiny, and without regard to civil or criminal liability,
have slowed down the tempo, encouraged extreme care and cau
tion, tempered reports and factual statements to even greater
conservatism. In addition to this broader dissemination of in
formation, the investor is furnished a most comprehensive pros
pectus, which, even if he does not read, he is privileged to file
away for future reference should any occasion arise. This is well
known to the issuer and dealer and may be an incentive to greater
precaution in salesmanship.
There has been much discussion of the twenty-day-waitingperiod provision of the law. While there are differences of opin
ion as to the effects of this provision, it has definitely tempered
and materially reduced so-called high pressure salesmanship.
An equally clear but contrary result has also occurred. No in
considerable number of investors, most of them experienced and
informed, impatient with any delay of opportunity to make a
desirable investment, insistently approach dealers in securities
for definite commitments on an allotment of forthcoming issues
well in advance of the twenty-day expiration and bring high
pressure to bear on the dealer for a commitment, which would
amount to a sale in direct violation of the law. The investor may
and frequently does apply his pressure under threat of transferring
all his business to another, who, if a less scrupulous observer of the
law, materially profits by satisfying the investment needs as well
as the demands of the customer through a transaction which
violates the securities act. It is easy to see the penalty against
the one and the premium available to the other.
The application of sections 17 and 20 of the law, commonly
referred to as the anti-fraud and injunction sections, of recent
months have been productive of noticeable material and beneficial
effects. Section 17 makes it unlawful to employ any fraudulent
scheme or device in the sale of securities through any instrumen
tality of interstate commerce; while section 20 grants the power
of injunction against any such schemes or devices. Heretofore
unscrupulous operators in securities transactions have sought to
cloak themselves with immunity against state laws on the plea
that their activities were interstate. In many instances local
authorities were quite helpless, and, there being no national au
thority outside the overburdened postal inspectors to check such
frauds, this group of underworld operators in the business carried
on to the detriment of the investing public and the goodwill of
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the business. The securities and exchange commission, through
its agents, has very wisely energetically attacked these practices
at several points. This activity is having telling effect for good.
If persisted in soundly, the effects should be definitely wholesome.
It will certainly be a great step forward if some plan can be
devised for coordination of the several efforts and activities
relative to the interstate sale of securities, whereby there will be
greater uniformity in activities by the federal and the respective
state agencies, thus materially decreasing the financial and kin
dred burdens of the present necessary compliance with a multi
plicity of laws and regulations.
There is now a disposition on the part of issuers, officers and
stockholders to be less fearful of publicity of facts heretofore re
garded as strictly confidential, publicity of which might or would
be detrimental to the private interests of such persons. Whether
the public is profiting or may profit through this publicity of per
sonal and confidential information, the future alone will tell.
This law should, and if the present high character of administra
tion is continued will, I believe, bring about some future mutual
consideration of the problems involved by administrative agen
cies, members of congress and representatives of those whose
businesses are directly affected by the law, resulting in better
ments and material simplifications. Like most other laws of this
character, the majority of the requirements laid down in the law
and through the regulations under the law are more regulatory for
legitimate business than against fraudulent practices.
I can not too strongly stress the effects of the administration of
the law, which are apart from the law itself. I can not speak in
too high terms of the character of the personnel of the commission
as presently constituted. With a less fair-minded, intelligent
and cooperative attitude, the effects might have been and in all
probability would have been materially different. With an
equally capable and conscientious personnel of the commission in
the future and with the proper and, in my opinion, very appro
priate spirit of cooperation, any adverse effects should be con
stantly reduced and beneficial effects amplified.
The recently announced plan for the appointment of a commit
tee to act as a consulting or conference committee with the com
mission is, in my opinion, a great step forward and should result
in much good for both the investment banker and the public.
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